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Black on Brown
Cass R. Sunstein*
Abstract
The most important and illuminating early writing on Brown v. Bd. of Education
is a nine-page essay by Charles Black. Black memorably shows that segregation was a
crucial part of a racial caste system. At the same time, he cuts through legal abstractions
that made it difficult to answer the question whether the Court’s decision was sufficiently
“neutral.” At the same time, Black’s argument suffers from two serious problems:
formalism and institution-blindness. Black writes as if his interpretation of the equal
protection clause can be simply read off the clause, and he does not engage the complex
institutional problems that were raised by the Court’s decision. Nonetheless, the legal
culture needs more voices like Black’s.

Of all the early writing on Brown v. Bd. of Education,1 the most striking is a ninepage essay by Charles Black.2 Black’s essay is striking because of its simplicity, its
concreteness, and its realism—its clear statement of what the system of segregation did
and meant, and of the relationship between that statement and Black’s reading of the
Constitution.
For three reasons, Black’s essay is worth careful consideration today. First, it
gives a vivid sense of the social realities that Brown actually confronted—a sense that
was entirely missing from the legal culture at the time, and one that often seems to have
been lost in contemporary discussions of the Brown problem. Second, Black’s essay
offers a distinctive understanding of what the equal protection clause should be taken,
above all, to forbid: the maintenance of a caste system. That understanding of the clause
seems to me correct, and it bears on a number of issues today. Third, Black provides a
sophisticated and morally committed version of a certain approach to constitutional
*
1

Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School.
347 US 483 (1954).

argument, one that retains considerable influence. I think that for all its virtues, his
approach suffers from the serious vices of formalism and institutional blindness. In
particular, Black’s approach suffers from its failure to see the issues that have arisen as a
result of the institutional turn of post-1980s constitutional law.3
We can learn a great deal about Brown by reading Black sympathetically. We can
learn something about constitutional interpretation by reading him skeptically. Let us
begin by listening to him.
I. The Sovereign Prerogative of Philosophers
Black begins with a two-part argument that he describes as “awkwardly simple.”4
First, the equal protection clause is best read to forbid state law from significantly
disadvantaging the Negro race as such. Second, segregation counts as a massive
intentional disadvantaging of the Negro race as such. “No subtlety at all. Yet I cannot
disabuse myself of the idea that that is really all there is to the segregation cases. If both
these propositions can be supported by a preponderance of argument, the cases were
rightly decided.”5
Black attempts to support the first proposition by reference to precedent. In
several cases, the Court had seemed to endorse it. To be sure, Plessy v. Ferguson6
appeared to be “a faltering from this principle.” But even in Plessy, the Court did not
repudiate the principle. On the contrary, the Court found it necessary to show that any
disadvantaging from segregation was produced not by state law, but by the “choice” of
those who construed it as a form of disadvantaging. Hence the fault of Plessy lay not in
2

See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale LJ 421 (1960).
See Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich L Rev 885 (2002).
The institutional turn has many strands and can be found in many places. See, e.g., Gerald Rosenberg, The
Hollow Hope (1993) (emphasizing limitations of courts in producing social change); Mark Tushnet, Taking
the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999) (raising doubts about judicial review); David A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1996) (emphasizing common law
approach toward Constitution). For my own views, see Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A Time (1999).
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its treatment of principle, but “in the psychology and sociology” of its approach to racial
separation.7 Of course Black recognizes that the idea of equal protection allows
disadvantages to be placed, intentionally, on some people rather than all; bad drivers can
be deprived of drivers’ licenses. The real question is whether there is a reasonable basis
for inequality. This question is not always easy to answer. “But history puts it squarely
out of doubt that the chief and all-dominating purpose” of the equal protection clause
“was to ensure equal protection for the Negro.”8 Thus the fourteenth amendment rules out
all possible arguments for discrimination against African-Americans.
Black is aware that history is not without some ambiguity here and that some
people believe that at the time of adoption, the fourteenth amendment was not taken to
forbid racial segregation. By way of response, he urges that any judgment about “the
‘intent’ of the men of 1866 on segregation as we know it calls for a far chancier guess
than is commonly supposed, for they were unacquainted with the institution as it prevails
in the American South today. To guess their verdict upon the institution as it functions in
the mid-twentieth century supposes an imaginary hypothesis which grows more
preposterous as it is sought to be made more vivid.”9
It is at this point that Black starts to pick up steam. He asks whether segregation
violates the equality principle, properly understood. He acknowledges that equality “has
marginal areas where philosophic difficulties are encountered. But if a whole race of
people finds itself confined within a system which is set up and continued for the very
purpose of keeping it in an inferior station, and if the question is the solemnly
propounded whether such a race is being treated ‘equally,’ I think we ought to exercise
one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers—that of laughter.” This is my favorite
sentence in Black’s essay; it ranks among the best sentences ever written by an American
law professor.

7
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Black continues that the real “question remaining (after we get our laughter under
control) is whether” segregation meets that description. Here Black confesses “a tendency
to start laughing all over again.” The initial reason is that he himself grew up under
conditions of segregation, and “it never occurred to anyone, white or colored, to question
its meaning.” Nor was personal experience the only support for this conclusion.
“Segregation in the South comes down in apostolic succession from slavery and the Dred
Scott case. The South fought to keep slavery, and lost. Then it tried the Black Codes, and
lost. Then it looked around for something else and found segregation.”10 There was
nothing consensual about segregation. It was imposed by whites, not agreed to by all.
Drawing on national experience, Black contends that separate was almost never
really equal. When African-Americans were given separate beaches and washrooms, they
were far worse than the beaches and washrooms given to whites. In education, “colored
schools have been so disgracefully inferior to white schools that only ignorance can
excuse those who have remained acquiescent members of a community that lived the
Molochian child-destroying lie that put them forward as ‘equal.’”11 Segregation could be
understood only in its historical setting, as part of a culture in which a “society that has
just lost the Negro as a slave, that has just lost out in an attempt to put him under quasiservile ‘Codes,’ the society that views his blood as a contamination and his name as an
insult, the society that extralegally imposes on him every humiliating mark of low caste
and that until yesterday kept him in line by lynching . . .” Those who see what
segregation actually means will not fall victim to arguments that amount to “one-stepahead-of-the-marshal correction” (another memorable phrase from Black, capturing
many forms of legal argument).
Black also seeks to explain the evident puzzlement of those in the legal culture
about the plain “fact that the social meaning of segregation is the putting of the Negro in
a position of walled-off inferiority.”12 How, he asks, can people actually wonder about
that not-hard question? Black contends that the answer lies in a fundamental mistake,
10
11

Id.
Id., at 426.
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which is to ask the question whether “segregation amounts to discrimination”
acontextually and in a historical vacuum. For lawyers and judges, the question cannot
sensibly be put that way. The real question is whether segregation amounts to
discrimination when it “is imposed by law in the twentieth century in certain specific
states in the American Union.” That question is hilariously easy. If it seems difficult, it is
only because of the absence of a “ritually sanctioned way in which the Court, as a Court,
can permissibly learn what is obvious to everybody else and to the Justices as
individuals.” But if this is the situation, the task of legal acumen is to find “ways to make
it permissible for the Court to use what it knows; any other counsel is of despair.”
To be sure, it had been argued, most prominently by Herbert Wechsler,13 that the
Brown decision should be understood to involve a conflict between the associational
preferences of whites and those of African-Americans. Wechsler thought that if the Court
was bound by neutral principles, that conflict would be hard to resolve: “For me,
assuming equal facilities, the question posed by state-sponsored segregation is not one of
discrimination at all. Its human and its constitutional dimensions lie entirely elsewhere, in
the denial by the state of freedom to associate, a denial that impinges in the same way on
any groups and races that may be involved. I think, and I hope not without foundation,
that the Southern white also pays heavily for segregation, not only in the sense of guilt he
must carry but also in the benefits he is denied.”14 Wechsler supported this claim with an
anecdote: “In the days when I was joined with Charles H. Houston in a litigation in the
Supreme Court, before the present building was constructed, he did not suffer more than I
in knowing that we had to go to Union Station to lunch together during the recess.”15
Here again we can hear Black’s ringing laughter. Houston was an exceptionally
distinguished lawyer, unable to eat lunch with his white co-counsel in the nation’s capitol
when engaged in legal argument before the nation’s highest court. In this world (almost)
anything is possible, but it would be astonishing if Houston “did not suffer more than”
12

Id. at 427.
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv L Rev 1 (1959).
14
Wechsler, supra note, at 34.
15
Id.
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5

Wechsler as a result of racial segregation. In any case Wechsler’s general challenge to
Brown was simple: A preference for one set of associational preferences seems to violate
the obligation of neutrality. How can a Court committed to neutral principles choose one
set over another? To this Black responds that Wechsler has badly misconceived the idea
of equality and hence that of neutrality. Of course any requirement of equality will “entail
some disagreeableness for” those who benefit from inequality. In other words, the idea of
equality does not counsel equality between equality and inequality; it favors the former.
If the fourteenth amendment is committed to equality, then it settles the question of how
to handle the conflict between the competing associational claims.
Black concludes that Brown is correct if the Constitution is “inconsistent with any
device that in fact relegates the Negro race to a position of inferiority.”16 In an uncannily
prescient statement, he urges that “in the end the decisions will be accepted by the
profession on just that basis.” He contends that the Court’s “judgments, in law and in
fact, are as right and true as any that ever was uttered.” In a footnote, Black makes just
one critical remark about the Court’s opinion, as distinct from its holding: “the venial
fault of the opinion consists in its not spelling out that segregation . . . is perceptibly a
means of ghettoizing the imputedly inferior race. (I would conjecture that the motive for
this omission was reluctance to go into the distasteful details of the southern caste
system.)”17
II. Caste and Context
Black’s essay has two cardinal virtues. The first is that he provides a clear and
appealing interpretation of the equal protection clause. In Black’s view, the clause forbids
state law from creating anything like a caste system. He uses the term “caste” twice, and
an anticaste principle18 unambiguously infuses his treatment of the problem of
segregation and indeed the principle for which he takes the equal protection clause to
16

Black, supra, at 429.
Id.
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I have argued in favor of this idea in Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410
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stand. What makes racial segregation impermissible is that it works, in intention and in
effect, to turn African-Americans into members of a lower caste. Black does not quote
from Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, but it is reasonable to
speculate that one of Harlan’s sentences helped to inspire him: “There is no caste here.”19
Note in this regard Black’s criticism of the Court’s opinion, charitably relegated to a
footnote, for its failure to spell out what segregation really is and does. Within the legal
culture, the failure to explore the “southern caste system,” or even to name it as such, was
remedied above all by Black’s own article.
The anticaste principle behind Black’s argument has not played the dominant role
in the constitutional law of equal protection. The clearest use of that principle was in
Loving v. Virginia,20 in which the Court struck down a ban on racial intermarriage with a
reference to the effort to maintain “White Supremacy.”21 But in the modern era, the equal
protection clause has been read to forbid governments from drawing distinctions on the
basis of race22—a reading that is fundamentally different from Black’s. Notice that Black
did not contend that segregation was unlawful because it amounted to an effort to make
race relevant for purposes of policy; he did not argue for a principle of color-blindness.
His claim was that segregation was unlawful because it amounted to an effort to keep one
group below another—to maintain the Southern caste system. In the modern era, this
view of the equal protection clause has had only one strong endorsement in a majority
opinion: Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in the Virginia Military Institute case.23
I believe that the anticaste principle is the correct reading of the clause, even though its
implementation would impose formidable burdens on courts.24
The second virtue of Black’s essay is that it offers a vivid, concrete, and realistic
understanding of segregation—a historicized understanding that cuts through the almost
comically uninformative and abstract accounts offered by Wechsler and others. Black’s
19

163 US at xx.
388 US 1 (1967).
21
Id. at xx.
22
See Adarand Contractors v. Pena, 115 S Ct 2097 (1995). Of course the doctrine here has become quite
complex and unruly.
23
US (199X).
20
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emphasis on the need to attend to “social meaning” is highly illuminating here; he rightly
suggests that segregation can be appreciated only if it is taken as a particular practice in
the American South. He is also correct to suggest that we ought to meet with “laughter”
the question whether racial segregation might not be a way of treating African-Americans
equally. Not incidentally, and in Black’s spirit, I believe that laughter is also the
appropriate reaction to the equally solemn question, usually answered “yes” by the
current Supreme Court,25 whether affirmative action programs deprive white Americans
of the equal protection of the laws. To be sure, such programs present difficult questions
of policy; they are often bad ideas. But on the constitutional question, the extraordinary
success of constitutional assaults on affirmative action programs is shocking and
disgraceful.
Black’s understanding of the anticaste principle does leave many open questions.
At times he speaks of purpose. At times he speaks of effect, as in the suggestion that the
Constitution “is inconsistent with any device that in fact relegates the Negro race to a
position of inferiority.” We can imagine cases in which either intent or effect is operative,
but not both. In any case many officials practices might be seen as entrenching a caste
system based on race. Does Black’s principle raise doubts about poll taxes, literacy tests
for voting, educational funding systems that disproportionately benefit whites, or
admissions requirements for universities that ensure overwhelming white student bodies?
Would Black’s principle raise questions about inadequate welfare and job training
programs? Do these also “relegate” African-Americans to a position of inferiority? And if
the equal protection clause forbids the maintenance of a system of racial caste, does it
also forbid the maintenance of a caste system based on gender? It would be possible to
generalize, from Black’s understanding of the equal protection clause, a principle that
forbids all official practices that turn morally irrelevant characteristics into a basis for
social subordination. Such a generalization is very much in the spirit of Black’s analysis.
But is this what he intends? And would the anticaste principle, thus understood, bear on
current debates about discrimination on the basis of disability and sexual orientation?

24
25

See id.
See note XX supra.

8

Would it require something like an Americans with Disabilities Act as a matter of
constitutional law? Would it require states to recognize same-sex marriages?
On Black’s behalf we might respond that however these questions might be
answered, the segregation issue was an easy one. With respect to that issue, the
conventional responses do have a “one-step-ahead-of-the-marshal” character. It is hardly
a decisive objection to Black’s argument that he has not specified all of its implications.
Insofar as Black sketched an appealing conception of the equal protection clause, and
memorably argued why segregation is inconsistent with that conception, he provided an
enduring service for the legal culture.
III. Of Formalism and Institution-Blindness
The vices of Black’s essay are as interesting as its virtues, and they are no less
important. In a way, Black’s essay seems of its time; its sense of moral engagement with
the issue of segregation has the unmistakable feel of certain academic writing in the
late1960s. But there is also a sense in which it is barely dated, taking the form of an
entirely recognizable kind of modern legal argument, academic and otherwise. Black’s
effort to identify the principle behind the equal protection clause, and his explanation of
why the practice in question violates that principle, is akin to countless current
explorations of constitutional issues.
Like many of those explorations, Black’s effort suffers from two serious
problems. The first is a kind of formalism—an approach that ignores the inevitable role
of evaluative judgments in constitutional interpretation. The second is a blindness to
institutional considerations—a neglect of variables that might make courts hesitate to
implement what would, as a matter of principle, count as the best interpretation of the
Constitution. The legal culture has obtained a far better understanding of those
considerations in the last two decades, and they help to illuminate difficulties in Black’s
approach.

9

A. Black’s Formalism
Formalism first. Black assumes far too readily that the equal protection clause
forbids any intentional disadvantaging of African-Americans. The clause does not
unambiguously do any such thing. It would be possible to understand the clause far more
narrowly, in a way that does not touch the practice of “separate but equal.” All by itself,
Plessy v. Ferguson provides some evidence of the plausibility of this reading: If an
overwhelming majority of the Supreme Court concluded, not long after ratification, that
the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid “separate but equal,” then there is reason to
think that this interpretation is at least textually plausible. In any case, a great deal of
historical research supports the view that the Fourteenth Amendment was not meant to
eliminate racial segregation and indeed that it was not meant to prohibit all intentional
disadvantaging of African-Americans.26 The Reconstruction Congress expressly
permitted the schools of the District of Columbia to remain segregated.27 The Fourteenth
Amendment was meant to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the
sponsors of that Act specifically disclaimed any intention to interfere with segregated
education.28
In these circumstances, it is implausible to say that the equal protection clause
necessarily has the meaning that Black ascribes to it. On narrow “originalist” grounds,
Brown is not simple to defend. Without adopting anything like Black’s general
understanding of the clause, Judge Michael McConnell, a committed originalist, has
made the most sustained, even heroic effort to demonstrate that racial segregation was
inconsistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.29 McConnell
places a great deal of emphasis on the efforts of Republicans in the Reconstruction
Congress to include schools within the scope of the 1875 Civil Rights Act; and he does
provide strong evidence that many and perhaps most legislators in that Congress believed
26

See Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 633-34 (1976); Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of
Equal Protection of the Laws, 1972 Wash U L Q 421, 460-62 (1977); Raoul Berger, Government by
Judiciary 123-25 (1977).
27
See Frank and Munro, supra, at 460-62.
28
See Statement of James Wilson, Cong Globe, 39th Cong, 1st Sess 1117-1118 (1866).
29
See Michael McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation decisions, 81 Va L Rev 947 (1995).
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that segregated schools were inconsistent with the principles underlying the Fourteenth
Amendment. The fact remains, however, that the post-ratification views of members of
Congress are not decisive evidence about constitutional meaning. Even more
fundamentally, the efforts to ban segregated schools ultimately failed (even if they
received considerable support within both houses of Congress). At most, Judge
McConnell has demonstrated that Congress had the constitutional authority to outlaw
racial segregation under the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He does
not come close to showing what is necessary to establish the correctness of Brown on
originalist grounds -- that the equal protection clause was originally understood as a selfexecuting ban on such segregation. Certainly Black does not demonstrate or even
maintain that it was so understood.
It is not even clear what approach to constitutional interpretation Black means to
endorse. Much of his argument seems to be roughly originalist, in the sense that he seems
to understand the meaning of the clause in accordance with the understanding of its
ratifiers. But he investigates the original understanding barely at all; his is not a historical
exegesis. The most he does is to urge, in response to originalist-style objections to
Brown, that any understanding of the view of 1866 calls for a “guess.” His fragmentary
argument on this count is quite sophisticated: “To guess their verdict upon the institution
as it functions in the mid-twentieth century supposes an imaginary hypothesis which
grows more preposterous as it is sought to be made more vivid.” This suggestion
presages some of the best contemporary discussions of how to deal with the original
understanding in unanticipated circumstances.30 But all this point shows is that the
original understanding is not necessarily fatal to Brown; Black does not urge that the
original understanding, carried forward to 1954, condemns school segregation. If a
“guess” is what is required, then Black’s reading of the fourteenth amendment is not,
strictly speaking, mandatory according to the tools that he himself purports to be using.

30

See Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Neutral Principles and Interpretivism,
96 Harv L Rev 781 (1983); Larry Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex L Rev 1165 (1993).
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What tools is he actually using? To the extent that Black’s reading emerges as
permissive, a choice among plausible alternatives, we should see him as engaged in a
distinctive kind of legal formalism—regrettably, the dishonorable kind,31 one that
pretends that a legal text has an unambiguous meaning even though normative judgments
must be made in order to invest it with that meaning. For a modern analogue, consider the
view, endorsed by a majority of the current Supreme Court, that strict scrutiny is required
for affirmative action programs because the Constitution forbids states from denying
equal protection to “any person.”32 This too is a form of dishonorable formalism: The fact
that the clause protects “any person” is neither here nor there on the question whether
strict scrutiny, or something else, should be applied to affirmative action programs.
In the end, Black’s reading of the equal protection clause can only be understood
interpretive in Ronald Dworkin’s sense of the word.33 Black is attempting not to track the
unambiguous meaning of that clause but to make best constructive sense of it, in a way
that inevitably involves judgments of Black’s own. Among the various possible
interpretations, those that “fit” the clause and its history, Black is venturing an approach
that seems most attractive to him on normative grounds. This point is not meant as an
objection to Black’s conclusions about the clause or the case. For constitutional
interpretation, there is no avoiding normative judgments of one or another kind.34 And
perhaps his interpretation is preferable to any other; in fact I believe that it is.35 The
problem is that Black does not defend his approach against imaginable alternatives; he
writes as if the principle can be read off the Constitution itself. If we were to be harsh, we
might even say that Black’s confidence about his view of the clause emerges as a form of
self-delusion, a claim of necessity that masks normative judgments of Black’s own.

31

This kind of dishonorable formalism is an ugly sibling of the entirely honorable (though controversial)
view that texts should be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning and that judges ought not to
rely on legislative history, statutory “purpose,” and the like. The best discussion is Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretive Choice, NYU L Rev.
32
See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 US 469 (1989).
33
See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1985).
34
I cannot defend this point in detail here. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict
(1996), for general discussion. Note that originalism itself represents a normative choice – to be originalist
– and then in hard cases, of which Brown (as Black shows) is an example, originalists are unlikely to be
able to make decisions simply by looking at history.
35
See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410 (1994).
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B. Black and Judicial Fallibility
The second problem is that Black neglect institutional issues. He see his tasks as
twofold: first, identification of the proper reading of the equal protection clause and
second, measurement of segregation against the clause, properly read. This approach to
the Constitution was typical of academic work in the 1960s and 1970s. It remains
common today. But it has a significant weakness. Black does not admit the possibility
that for a court, the proper reading of the clause is closely attuned to the institutional
limitations of judges. The institutional turn of post-1980s scholarship has pointed to
several reasons why this might be so. Judicial efforts to promote social reform might not
be productive; they might even be counterproductive, endangering the very goals that the
judges seek.36 Judicial judgments about (legally relevant) moral values might not be
reliable, and hence it might be best if judges, aware of their own moral fallibility, are
reluctant to impose those values on the nation.37 In any case judicial insistence on certain
moral commitments, even appealing ones, might preempt democratic deliberation on the
underlying questions; and if citizens have a right to be self-governing, judges might be
interpret the Constitution with that right in mind.
If any of these claims is correct, then judges with a set of reasonable, optional
interpretations might select the interpretation that the one that minimizes the judicial role
in American society—not because that interpretation is best out of context, but because it
is best-suited to judicial capacities. Emphasizing that their own readings are prone to
error, judges might read constitutional clauses, whenever possible, in such a way as to
minimize judicial intrusions into democratic processes. James Bradley Thayer famously
defended “the rule of clear mistake”—the view that courts should uphold legislation
unless it is unambiguously unconstitutional.38 A limited reading of the equal protection
clause, one that would not reach segregation, might be defended on the ground that it
36

See Rosenberg, supra note.
See Tushnet, supra.
38
See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
Harv L Rev 129 (1893).
37
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reduces the judicial role in American life. I am not defending that limited reading; I am
simply noticing that Black fails to explore the arguments that might be made in its favor.
Note that this limited reading would be a court-specific one. It would not preclude
the possibility that other institutions, not facing the limitations of the judiciary, would
understand the equal protection clause more broadly. Black did not pause to consider the
possibility that in some areas, constitutional rights might be judicially underenforced, for
institutional reasons stemming from the courts’ properly limited role in American
government.39 If we take seriously a more general anticaste principle, judicial limitations
seem highly relevant. A court that is committed to counteract the caste-like features of
American society would closely scrutinize a number of seemingly neutral practices that
have racially discriminatory effects, such as tests for education and employment on
which whites do systematically better than African-Americans. To say the least, this close
scrutiny would put courts into an awkward position.40
I have suggested the possibility that judges should adopt a narrower
understanding of the equal protection clause simply because of an awareness of their own
institutional weaknesses, recognizing that the broader reading might be acceptable or
even preferable for other branches of government. If the meaning of the Constitution, at
the judicial level, is a product of substantive theory and institutional constraint, then
Black’s reading of the equal protection clause might be rejected on the ground that it
emphasizes the former but neglects the latter. Compare the contemporary question
whether the Constitution requires states to recognize same-sex marriages. Let us suppose,
as I believe, that the best interpretation of the equal protection clause does so require—
that states have no adequate basis for discriminating against gays and lesbians in this
way. Even if this is so, federal courts might hesitate to insist on that interpretation for
prudential reasons.41 The nation might reject the courts’ interpretation, in a way that

39

See Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure: The Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv L Rev
1212 (1978).
40
See Washington v. Davis, 426 US 229 (1976).
41
The case of state courts is different. See Cass R. Sunstein, The New Republic (2003).
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disserves the very values at stake—a possibility that is relevant, whether or not it is
decisive, for constitutional law.42
Alternatively, judges might have chosen to read the equal protection clause
narrowly in the particular context of segregation, not because they are generally errorprone, but in the interest of ensuring that courts are not placed in an especially difficult
remedial role. There can be no doubt that the political question doctrine has a pale echo
in the numerous cases interpreting constitutional clauses so as to avoid collisions with
other institutions.43 In some contexts, the echo deserves to be a bit louder, simply because
a ruling would force courts to engage in managerial tasks that are beyond their
competence. Black does not confront this possibility in the context of school segregation,
and it is a serious gap in his argument. His silence here is characteristic. Later in his life,
Black made eloquent pleas on behalf of a constitutional requirement that governments
provide a decent economic minimum -- a social safety net below which no citizen may be
allowed to fall.44 Put to one side the question whether this requirement can be found in
the Constitution through appropriate interpretive methods. Even if it can, judicial
oversight of the welfare system would put courts in a position for which they are
especially ill-suited.45
None of this means that Brown is wrong; like nearly everyone else (now, as
opposed to during the 1960s, when the legal culture was sharply divided), I believe that
Black was right to insist that it was right. But Black’s argument on its behalf is badly
incomplete. It is not sufficient to identify the most appealing interpretation of a clause
and then to measure a challenged practice against that interpretation. A pervasive
question has to do with judicial capacities and competence.
Conclusion

42

For the classic discussion, by a contemporary of Black, see Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch (1965).
43
See, e.g., Rostker v, Goldberg, 453 US 57 (1981); this term’s campaign finance decision.
44
See Charles Black, A New Birth of Freedom (1997).
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In a sense, Black’s argument can be seen as a great triumph for legal realism in
American constitutional law. What makes his essay so important is that it cuts through
abstractions, pervasive in law schools and in courts, that had made it nearly impossible to
see what Brown was about. I have criticized Black for his formalism and for his neglect
of institutional considerations. But we need more voices like Charles Black’s.
To see why, return to Herbert Wechsler’s puzzlement about the lawfulness of the
segregation decision. If we are to laugh at Wechsler, our laughter had better not be
complacent. We should not treat Wechsler as a relic of history, someone whose errors
cannot find analogues today. After all, Wechsler was extremely active in the civil rights
movement, to which he was personally dedicated. As a lawyer, he helped to assist
Thurgood Marshall and others in the attack on segregation. His difficulty in justifying
Brown was not motivated by the slightest sympathy for the practices that the Court
invalidated. Wechsler was anguished by that difficulty.
Wechsler’s closing question was this: “Given a situation where the state must
practically choose between denying the association to those who wish it or imposing it on
those who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding that the
Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail?”46 Questions like
this continue to haunt the legal system. But Black’s answer is simple. By its very nature,
the equality principle is not neutral between inequality and equality; and this is not an
embarrassment for the equality principle. That answer is not just Black’s but Brown’s as
well. I think that it has enduring and insufficiently appreciated implications for
constitutional law in general.

45
46

I discuss this question in Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993).
Wechsler, supra note.
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Readers with comments may address them to:
Cass R. Sunstein
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
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